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military. He devalues by this logic large
portions of ground and tactical air forces
supplied by the Army and Air Force, particularly in recognition of likely diminishing defense budgets. He is not opposed
to joint warfare. He supports all the
catchphrases (dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, focused logistics) popularized in
the chairman’s Joint Vision documents.
He just feels that, provided space and information superiority, the sea services
can execute the bulk of this strategy.
While Deitchman argues that the book is
descriptive rather than prescriptive, its
strongest points are its prescriptions for
developing a rational and affordable national military strategy. In particular, his
arguments for the development of technology-driven armed forces with information superiority are compelling. His
case against “lean” armed forces and
overreliance on the civilianization of military jobs is equally powerful.
Deitchman’s principal contribution to
the strategic debate is his approach to
handling two major regional contingencies (MRCs), if required. He opts to build
technologically sophisticated and highly
maneuverable conventional forces to address any military challenge (or to fight
one MRC) while explicitly threatening a
nuclear “rain of destruction” on anyone
irresponsible enough to attack American
vital interests while the United States is
so occupied. As a true strategist, he
thereby matches “ends” to “means” by
allowing himself the opportunity to reduce the size of the relatively expensive
conventional forces.
A large portion of the book is a seemingly
unnecessary primer on America and the
“exceptional” traits that either explain its
greatness or foretell its doom. Whether
or not the American education system is
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fundamentally flawed or Americans are
losing their work ethic obviously are debatable points. However, Deitchman’s
insistence that the United States engage
in this self-examination is useful and
meaningful. Most monographs on national security simply skip over this
realm and presume the solution.
Deitchman forces the reader to delve
deeper and to understand the social, economic, and psychological forces underpinning American security strategy. It is a
journey well worth taking, even though a
reader may disagree with the author as
often as not.
Unless one is fortunate enough to spend
a year at one of the nation’s war colleges
contemplating this subject, there is no
better way to view the process of developing U.S. national strategy than to
spend some time with this book.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

Tucker, Jonathan B. Scourge: The Once and Future
Threat of Smallpox. Berkeley, Calif.: Atlantic Monthly
Press, 2001. 304pp. $26

In real estate, the three most important
things are “location, location, location.”
In nonfiction book writing, the counterpart is “timing, timing, timing.” The
publication of Scourge in early September
2001 could not have been more timely.
The book is not a rapidly compiled,
superficial response to the attacks of
11 September but an in-depth study of
smallpox. Jonathan B. Tucker traces the
history of the disease from ancient Egypt
through India to China, where it was
called “Hunpox,” apparently because it
was believed to have been imported by
the Huns. Smallpox, we are reminded,
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contributed to the defeat of Athens by
Sparta in the Peloponnesian War.

Americans were when Europeans
brought the disease to the New World.

Unlike anthrax, smallpox is extremely
contagious, and it is readily transmitted
from one human to another. It can have
a fatality rate of greater than one third,
making it a candidate as a weapon of
mass destruction. However, as a weapon,
it is uncontrollable, and the using side
may become victim to it unless its members have been inoculated.

The debate continues as to whether
smallpox has ceased to be a potential
scourge of mankind. There are two
known collections of the smallpox virus,
located in Atlanta, Georgia, and in Moscow. The World Health Organization has
been attempting to destroy all the viral
stock, but it has been blocked by the
United States and Russia, as well as some
in the scientific community. At this writing, the deadline for its destruction is
spring 2002. The deadline for the final
destruction of all stockpiles has been
changed in the past, and that may happen
again.

In 1790 an English country doctor
named Edward Jenner noticed that milkmaids appeared not to contract the disease, an observation that ultimately led to
the use of the cowpox virus as a vaccine
against smallpox. The science of the
mechanism was not understood until
recently, but over the next 170 years vaccination banished smallpox in industrialized countries, although it continued to
infect the developing world. (In 1939 it
was discovered that the vaccine in use
was “vaccinia,” which was genetically distinct from both smallpox [variola] and
cowpox. Where vaccinia had come from
and how it became the standard
inoculant remains a mystery.)
In 1967 the World Health Organization
launched a global campaign to eradicate
smallpox, and within a decade the last
natural outbreak was snuffed out. The
success of the eradication program was to
a great extent owed to the leadership of
D. A. Henderson. The history of smallpox
might have ended there, but for the defection of the Soviet military scientist
Kanatjan Alibekov (a.k.a. Ken Alibek)
who revealed that the Soviet Union maintained an active program to weaponize
smallpox. Smallpox vaccination does not
induce lifelong immunity, so should the
disease be reintroduced, revaccination
would be required. Currently, the whole
world is susceptible, much as the Native
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Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of
Smallpox is not alarmist; it gives a balanced, in-depth account of the history,
politics, and science one should know
about the disease. No technical background is required to understand the
complexities of the political issues. The
book may be read as three separate parts:
chapters 1 to 4 deal with the historical
understanding of smallpox and its relation to mankind; chapters 5 to 7 describe
the successful global eradication effort;
and chapters 8 to 12 discuss current politics and worst-case scenarios for reintroduction of the disease.
Jonathan Tucker is well qualified to write
this book, having an undergraduate
background in biology and a Ph.D. in
political science. He was on the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
project technical staff that wrote the respected 1993 reports Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Assessing
the Risks, and Technologies Underlying
Weapons of Mass Destruction. His book is
recommended reading for anyone who
wishes to claim competent opinions on
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weapons of mass destruction and
bioterrorism.
XAVIER MARUYAMA

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

FitzGerald, Frances. Way Out There in the Blue:
Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 2000. 499pp. $30

In 1984, while the Cold War was raging,
then-Senator Gary Hart expressed a sentiment shared by many then and now:
“It’s unfortunate and tragic. The Reagan
Administration has to understand that
our relationships with the Soviet Union
spring from whether or not we’re achieving arms control. If we’re not achieving
arms control, then it spills over into and
colors every other aspect of our relationship.” While it purports to be something
else, Frances FitzGerald’s Way Out There
in the Blue adopts the same theme. It is
virtually impossible to turn to any page
in the book and not find a critical discussion of arms control—mostly, of course,
regarding the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty.
Folks who work in the U.S. government
often say, “We know we don’t get it right
all of the time, but can we really get it
wrong all of the time?” The author, however, can find no redemption for the Reagan years—they got it wrong, at every
step, all of the time. Those who toiled in
Washington through those years were
both wrongheaded and wrong-hearted,
according to FitzGerald. As a consequence, as analysis the book is deficient;
it qualifies more appropriately as applied
ideology. As a wag once put it, “Ideology
is a filter through which facts pass for
interpretation.”
So, the story of Way Out There in the
Blue is of a simple-minded President
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Reagan surrounded and captured by
hard-line anticommunists, bent on confrontation with the Soviet Union and
heating up the arms race in pursuit of a
foolish dream. On essentially every page
one feels the author’s contempt and disdain, derision and ridicule, for the “star
wars” program and for the benighted approach of the two Reagan administrations. This is not a balanced attempt to
understand the policy and politics of the
Reagan years but a savage skewering.
The book’s focus is on politics and arms
control, but the author’s lack of understanding of strategy deeply undermines
her already flawed presentation. Throughout the book FitzGerald ridicules the notion that a defense, any defense, can be
perfect. However, strategists recognize
that perfection is not at issue. A defense
need be only good enough to forestall an
attack. If an attacker can be made to believe that his offensive thrust will fail,
then the defense will not be challenged.
For example, if an attacker has twenty
ballistic missile warheads and is faced by
a defense with interceptors each of which
is judged to be 80 percent effective, he
might, if he chooses to disarm himself by
firing all of his warheads, expect to have
four warheads penetrate the defense.
Well, that might be true if the defense
shoots only one interceptor at each incoming warhead. On a given day, the defense might opt to use more than one, so
its effectiveness might be significantly
better than 80 percent. Accordingly, a
reasonable strategic assumption of
would-be attackers would be that opposing defenses will work, and will work well.
Yet there is another overarching strategic
factor at work here. To shoot missiles at
the United States is not the same as
shooting them at Australia or Belgium;
whether or not any missiles get through
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